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Factors associated with the introduction of
classical swine fever virus into pig herds in
the central area of the 1997/98 epidemic in
the Netherlands
A. R. W. ELBERS, J. A. STEGEMAN, M. C. M. DE JONG
A matched case-control study of 135 infected and 99 uninfected pig herds from the central area of the 1997
to 1998 epidemic of classical swine fever (CSF) in The Netherlands was undertaken to identify factors
associated with the introduction of the virus. The herds were matched on the basis of herd type and the
shortest geographical distance between pairs of herds. Data on management, hygienic measures,
experiences during the depopulation of an infected nearest neighbour, and the frequency of contact with
professionals and other agencies were collected by means of a questionnaire taken by personal interview.
There were no significant differences between the infected and uninfected herds in the median total number
of contacts per year with professionals and other agencies either with or without contact with the pigs. On
the basis of a multivariable analysis, five variables were found to be significantly associated with an
increased risk of infection: (1) the presence of commercial poultry on the premises; (2) visitors entering the
pig units without wearing an overcoat or overalls and boots supplied by the farm; (3) the driver of the lorry
transporting pigs for the Pig Welfare Disposal Scheme (PWDS) using his own boots instead of boots supplied
by the farm; (4) herds of moderate size (500 to 1000 animals) and very large herds (>7000 animals) were at
greater risk than small herds (<500 animals); and (5) an aerosol, produced during high-pressure cleaning of
the electrocution equipment used to kill the pigs on a neighbouring infected herd less than 250 m away was
carried by the wind on to the premises. Two variables were significantly associated with a decreased risk of
csFv-infection: (1) more than 30 years of experience in pig farming; and (2) additional cleaning of the lorries
used to transport pigs for the PWDS before they were allowed on to the premises. In the opinion of the
cooperating farmers, airborne transmission of the virus and its transmission during the depopulation of
an infected neighbour were among the most important routes of infection.
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AFTER classical swine fever (CSF) had been absent from the
Netherlands for five years and from the region concerned for
10 years, a pig farm in the municipality of Venhorst in the
southern part of the Netherlands was diagnosed to be infected
on February 4, 1997. The herd was located in an area with one
of the highest densities of pigs and pig herds in Europe. It is
most likely that the CSF virus (CSFV) was introduced into the
area by a returning pig transport lorry (Elbers and others
1999). A total of 429 outbreaks were observed during the epi-
demic, mainly in the southern part of the Netherlands, and
all the pigs (approximately 625,000) from the infected herds
were slaughtered (Fig 1).
During the eradication campaign attempts were made to
establish how the virus had been introduced into the
infected herds. The tracing focused on pigs, visitors, trans-
port vehicles, artificial insemination, manure and the pick-
up service of the rendering plant as potential routes of
transmission (Elbers and others 1999). However, in approx-
imately 50 per cent of the outbreaks none of these possible
routes of transmission was incriminated, an observation
similar to that in other epidemics of CSF in Europe
(Wachendorfer and others 1978, Vannier and others 1986,
Terpstra 1987, Miry and others 1991, Pittler and others 1996,
Vanthemsche 1996). Herds with an unknown source of
infection are usually subdivided into herds within 1 km of
a previously infected herd and herds at a greater distance.
The former are designated as neighbourhood infections and
the latter as infections with an unknown origin (Terpstra
1987). In the 1997 to 1998 epidemic in the Netherlands, 39
per cent of the outbreaks were classified as neighbourhood
infections and 11 per cent as unknown. The fact that herds
close to an infected herd have a higher risk of becoming
infected than herds at a greater distance was observed dur-
ing the 1930s in the Netherlands (Robijns 1971), and it has
continued to be of importance ever since (Wachendorfer
and others 1978, Kramer and others 1995, Koenen and oth-
ers 1996, Staubach and others 1997, Stegeman and others
2000). These neighbourhood infections may be caused by
contacts which are known to be able to transmit the virus
but have not been reported to the veterinary authorities.
However, they may also be caused by types of contact that
are not known to be able to transmit the virus. However,
apart from a suggestion that airborne spread may play a role
(Laevens 1998, Mintiens and others 2000), no routes for
these neighbourhood infections have been identified.
The epidemic spread extensively in the central area
around the primary outbreak (Fig 2), but there were many
herds in the area that did not become infected. Unknown
routes of infection or unreported contacts may have been
responsible for these differences, and variations in the use
of hygienic measures that affect the ability of the virus to
establish the infection may also have been important. The
purpose of this study was to find out whether interherd con-
tacts and herd hygienic factors which were not investigated
by the veterinary authorities might have been associated with
the introduction of CSFV. The findings may lead to new
hypotheses concerning the transmission and prevention of
CSF.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study population
The study population consisted of herds in an area of 339 km2
around the primary outbreak. At the start of the epidemic
there were 972 pig herds in the area; 49-7 per cent of them
were finishing or replacement stock herds, and the rest were
breeding herds and farrow-to-finish herds. A total of 233
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FIG 1: Surveillance zones and outbreaks of the 1997/98
classical swine fever epidemic in the Netherlands
herds became infected, 63 (27 per cent) ofwhich had no sows.
Since this investigation was focused on the introduction of
CSFv by alternative routes of infection and the effect of
hygienic measures, the following types of infected herds were
excluded: (1) herds infected by animal contact; (2) herds pos-
sibly infected by contaminated semen from an infected boar
station; (3) herds infected before the detection of the primary
outbreak; and (4) the two infected boar stations in the area.
A total of 196 of the infected pig herds met the inclusion cri-
teria, and 52 (26-5 per cent) of them had no sows. However,
61 (31 per cent) of these herds refused to participate in the
investigation. Of the remaining 135 herds, 29 (21-5 per cent)
had no sows, a distribution not significantly different from
the herds that met the inclusion criteria. Of the 131 unin-
fected herds that were asked to participate in the investiga-
tion, 32 refused to cooperate.
Study design
Infected herds (cases) were matched with uninfected herds
(controls) in clusters on the basis of the herd type (with or
without sows) and their being within a radius of 2 km. Since
there were 36 fewer control herds than case herds, 1:1 match-
ing was not possible. Sixty clusters of cases and controls were
established with an average of four herds per cluster (mini-
mum two herds, maximum 10 herds).
Questionnaire
Information on farm management and the attitudes of the
farmers to hygiene was collected by means of a questionnaire.
In addition, the farmers' opinions with respect to the possi-
ble reasons for the infection or lack of infection of their herd
and of their neighbours' herds was recorded by personal inter-
view. The questionnaire was based on expert opinions and its
layout and the way in which the questions were asked was
supported by a professional marketing research agency
(MarketResponse). The questionnaire was initially tested
on four pig farmers and their families, and then evaluated
and revised. The farmers were interviewed by qualified staff,
who received special training in interviewing and taking
questionnaires.
- 3. 3. - 0 9.~~~~- ~ ~ 92 1 4 1W 10 ~ ~
FIG 2: Central area of the 1997/98 classical swine fever epidemic in the Netherlands with
infected and non-infected pig herds and pre-emptively slaughtered pig herds around
infected herds
The questionnaire took about one to one-and-a-half
hours to fill in, and the farmers were compensated for their
time by an allowance of 75 Dutch guilders. It consisted of
questions on general demography (age, family, experience in
pig farming, etc), the herd (herd size, other species, entrance
to the premises, use of hygienic precautions, etc). The num-
bers of times per week/month/year (recalculated to numbers
of times per year) that persons or agencies contacted the herd
for professional reasons were recorded, and subdivided into
when they contacted the premises (but not the pig units), and
when they had contact with the pig units (either with or with-
out contact with the pigs), in the period before and after the
detection of the primary outbreak on February 4, 1997.
Separate records were kept for the following persons or agen-
cies: colleagues with pigs; neighbours, family and friends;
playmates of children; pig, sheep, cattle, or poultry trader; for-
age trader; milkman; people buying fruit and vegetables at the
farm; greengrocer; baker's man; oil and/or liquid gas supplier;
lorry bringing frozen snacks; representative of farmers' asso-
ciation; dairy herd improvement agency service; breeding
company consultant; agricultural extension service; repre-
sentative of slaughterhouse organisation; veterinary practi-
tioner; veterinary consultant national animal health service;
environmental control technician; feed-mill consultant; ver-
min control consultant; gas and electricity fitter; contractor;
manure/slurry transporter; pig and cattle artificial insemi-
nation technician; sow scanner; broiler catchers; poultry, cat-
tle, sheep, dairy tanker; rendering pick-up service; journalists;
excursions; agricultural trainee; (temporary) farm help;
Agricultural Inspection Service; National Inspection Service
for Livestock and Meat; screening and tracing teams of the
CSF-eradication campaign.
Questions were asked about attitudes to hygiene and mea-
sures taken after the detection of the primary outbreak in the
area, and about the attitudes towards the collection of carcases
by the rendering service. Questions were also asked about
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Infected herds Uninfected herds
(°h of owners) (O/o of owners)Reasons for refusal
Too busy with other duties 38 53
The subject of the study recalls too many emotions 16 16
Reasons for infection should be known by now 14 3
Ownership of herd has changed 9 6
More than one location was infected, but only one interview allowed 73
Allowance to cooperate in the study is inadequate 7 0
Great discontent with the organisation of the eradication campaign 519
Pig farmer does not want to allow visitors to the herd 3 0
Owner refuses to allow anyone to speak with the person who 2 0
works with the pigs
contacts with the veterinary practitioner, the artificial insem-
ination service, the pest control service, the slurry transport
service, the sow scanning service and mechanics. Additional
questions were asked about the presence on the farm and the
behaviour of dogs, cats, birds, and rodents such as rats and
mice.
Statistical analysis
The frequency of contact by different professional persons
and agencies per year was not normally distributed, and the
differences in the median total contact frequency between the
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FIG 3: Median numbers of self-reported contacts of different types per year in the period
before (red columns) and after (blue columns) the detection of the primary outbreak of
classical swine fever recorded in 58 finishing herds of different sizes (1: <500 pigs,
2: 500-1000 pigs, 3: 1000-7000 pigs; 4: >7000 pigs)
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FIG 4: Median numbers of self-reported contacts of different types per year in the period
before (red columns) and after (blue columns) the detection of the primary outbreak of
classical swine fever in 176 sow herds of different sizes (1: <500 pigs, 2: 500-1000 pigs,
3: 1000-7000 pigs; 4: >7000 pigs)
infected and uninfected herds were, therefore, tested with the
non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test.
The questionnaire data were analysed by using a gener-
alised linear model (PROC GENMOD; SAS 1993). To account for
the 'matched design' of the investigation, clusters of matched
pig herds were entered into the model as a fixed effect. The
response (infected or uninfected) was modelled by using a
binomial probability distribution and the fixed and random
components of the model were linked with a logit-link func-
tion. The response was also modelled as an infection rate, in
which case the response was scaled by the 'population of pigs
at risk per unit time'
By using this scaling process, the herds became more com-
parable, because the level and duration of exposure was quan-
tified. The scaling factor was calculated by accumulating the
average number of pigs present in a herd each week since
January 1, 1997, the presumed date of introduction of CSFV
into the Netherlands, until the estimated date of infection of
the herd. For the uninfected herds this period ended at the
date of pre-emptive slaughter, or complete buy-out of the
herd in the case of finishing-pig herds, and for herds with
sows that continued to produce piglets, in the summer of
1997, when the last infected herd in the data set was detected.
The infection rate was modelled by using a Poisson proba-
bility distribution and a log-link function (PROC GENMOD; SAS
1993). Because modelling the infection rate produced virtu-
ally the same significant risk factors as modelling the
response, the results of modelling the infection rate are not
presented separately. The linearity of the regression estimates
for the continuous variables was checked graphically. When
there was a lack of linearity, continuous variables were cate-
gorised. The first step in the statistical analysis involved
screening all the single explanatory variables in a bivariate
regression model. Variables with a P<020 were considered for
further analysis if there was a biologically plausible associa-
tion between the variable and the response. In the second step,
a backward step-wise selection of variables in a cluster of bio-
logically related variables, for example, variables concerning
the hygienic measures taken by the farmer, was applied in a
multivariate model. In the final step, variables that turned up
during the second step were put together in a multivariate
model and, by a backward selection process, variables were
selected until a model remained with variables with a P<0-05.
The strength of an association was measured in terms of odds
ratios (OR). An OR significantly smaller than 1-0 indicates that
the factor reduces the probability of the event, whereas an OR
significantly greater than 1 0 indicates that the factor increases
the probability of the event. In using the multivariate model,
the OR for a specific risk factor has been adjusted for the other
factors in the model. An OR was considered to be statistically
significant if 1 0 did not fall within the 95 per cent confidence
interval (ci) of the OR.
Complete separation - that is, a factor which was present
only in the infected group and not in the uninfected group,
or vice versa - occurred during the modelling (Hosmer and
Lemeshow 1989). In this case, the factor does not fit into the
model, although there can be a biologically meaningful asso-
ciation between the factor and the response. The factors
responsible for complete separation during the modelling are
presented separately.
RESULTS
General
The reasons for farmers' refusal to cooperate with the study
indicate that there were no big differences between the cases
and the controls (Table 1), except for 'having no time' and
'having trouble with the organisation of the eradication
campaign'.
The Veterinary Record, September 29, 2001
7orIF-TiTswipirn-iini
d I lM(;ACfMtW4&'Itllq'M
379
 group.bmj.com on December 14, 2011 - Published by veterinaryrecord.bmj.comDownloaded from 
PAPERS & ARTICLES
Self-reported contact frequency
There were no significant differences between the infected and
uninfected herds in the median total numbers of contacts by
professional persons and agencies per year either with the
premises (but not in the pig units), or with the pig units (either
with or without contact with the pigs), in the period before
and after the detection of the primary outbreak on February
4, 1997. The median total number of contacts with the
premises and with the pig units without having contact with
the pigs inside was significantly higher (P<0-001) in the period
before than after the detection of the primary outbreak (Figs
3, 4). In contrast, there was a slight tendency for the median
total number of contacts with the pig units and with the pigs
inside to be larger in the period after than before the detection
of the primary outbreak. In general, there was no positive rela-
tionship between the herd size and the median total number
of contacts, and only in the case of pig-finishing farms was an
increase in mean herd size related to an increase in the median
total number of contact with the premises.
Factors associated with risk of infection
A frequency distribution of the factors associated univariately
with the response (P<0 10) is given in Table 2. The relation-
ships needed to be biologically plausible with respect to the
interpretation of risk awareness or risk-seeking. It gives a first
impression of the potential associations between the factors
and the response. There were no associations between the
presence (or increased presence after depopulation of an
infected neighbouring herd) of birds (sparrows, crows and
birds of prey), cats, rats or mice around the premises and an
increased risk of infection. In the final model seven factors
remained (P<0.05), five of which were associated with an
increased risk of infection (Table 3):
(1) The presence of commercial poultry in addition to pigs;
(2) Visitors could enter the pig units without wearing an over-
coat or overalls and boots supplied by the farm;
(3) The driver of the lorry transporting pigs for the Pig
Welfare Disposal Scheme (PWDS) used his own boots
instead of boots supplied by the farm;
(4) The herd was of moderate (500 to 1000 animals) or very
large size (>7000 animals) rather than small (<500 ani-
mals) or large (1000 to 7000 animals) size;
(5) An aerosol produced during the high-pressure cleaning of
the electrocution equipment used to depopulate a neigh-
bouring infected herd within 250 m was carried by the
wind on to the premises.
Two factors were significantly associated with a decreased
risk of infection:
(1) The farmer had more than 30 years of experience in pig
farming;
(2) The lorry used to transport pigs for the PWDS was cleaned
by the farmer outside the farmyard before it was allowed
to enter.
As an example of the strength of the association between
a factor and the response, pig herds whose farmers had less
than 30 years of experience in pig farming were 33 times more
likely to become infected than herds whose farmers had more
than 30 years of experience.
Three factors associated with an increased risk of infec-
tion could not be included in the model because the infected
and uninfected groups were separated completely by the
covariate:
(1) The lorry carrying portable electrocution equipment
which had been used to depopulate an infected neighbour
turned into the farmyard in order to be able to drive in
another direction, owing to its lack of manoeuvarbility on
small country roads;
Infecte(
herds (4Factors
.d
1/)
Commercial poultry present in addition to pigs 5-9
More than 30 years of experience in pig farming 4.4
Visitors have to give notice of their presence (ring) at the residence of 72-7
the pig farmer in order to reach the pig units
Overcoat or overalls and boots are always supplied to visitors before 88-9
entrance is allowed to the pig units
Disinfection mats were in place at the entrance for cars and lorries 23-7
to drive over
The farmer's dog can walk freely on and outside the premises 60-7
Someone from outside helps with household cleaning 17-0
The above person has pigs at their own home 0-7
Neighbouring pig farmer helps to carry carcases of heavy finishers or 5-9
sows to the pick-up location at the entrance of the farmyard to be
picked up by the lorry from the rendering plant
The lorry from the rendering plant has contact with the farmyard 19-3
The container in which carcases of small to medium size pigs were 1.5
disposed of was transported by the farmer into the farmyard after
the rendering service had emptied it
The lorry used to transport pigs for the Pig Welfare Disposal Scheme (PWDS) 54-1
is cleaned by the farmer before it is allowed to enter the farmyard
The driver of the lorry used for the PWDS used his own boots instead 14.8
of boots supplied by the farm
Veterinary practitioner used overcoat or overalls supplied by the 94-1
farm when entering the pig units
Veterinary practitioner used boots supplied by the farm when 95-6
entering the pig units
Vermin control service enters the pig units 21.5
The vermin control service went directly from the pig units to their 2-2
car to pick up additional equipment without using the hygiene lock
An aerosol produced during high pressure cleaning of the electrocution 11-1
equipment used to depopulate an infected herd within 250 m was
carried by the wind on to the farmyard
The lorry carrying portable electrocution equipment used to depopulate 0.7
an infected neighbour turned into the farmyard in order to drive
in another direction
Herd size - <500 animals 36-3
- 500-1000 animals 42-2
- 1000-7000 animals 19-3
- >7000 animals 2-2
Lorries from the rendering plant, used to transport pigs killed by 3.0
electrocution during the depopulation of an infected neighbouring
herd, turned into the farmyard in order to drive in another direction
Uninfected
herds (O/o)
2-0
18-2
60-7
93.9
38-4
47-5
9-1
0
1.0
13-1
0
63-6
4-0
98-0
98-0
11-1
0
3-0
0
49-5
21-2
28-3
1-0
1-0
(2) The container in which carcases of small to medium size
pigs were disposed, was carried into the farmyard after it
Risk factors OR 95% Cl
Commercial poultry present in addition to pigs Yes 24-8 2-5-80-7
No 1*
Experience in pig farming <30 years 33.4 6.2-178.3
>30 years 1*
Overcoats or overalls and boots always supplied to visitors Yes1*
before they are allowed to enter the pig units No 34.9 1-4-861-1
Lorry used to transport pigs for the Pig Welfare Disposal Scheme Yes 1 *
(PWDS) is cleaned by the farmer before it is allowed No 5.9 2.3-15-1
to enter the farmyard
Driver of the lorry used to transport pigs for the PWDS used Yes 8-1 1-8-37-1
his own boots instead of boots supplied by the farm No 1 *
Herd size (sows + finishers + replacement stock) <500 1 *
500-1000 6-6 2-5-17-7
1000-7000 0-7 0-3-1-2
>7000 397-5 1-1-15x104
An aerosol produced during high-pressure cleaning of the Yes 39-1 5-2-294.2
electrocution equipment used to depopulate an infected herd No 1 *
within 250 m was carried by the wind on to the premises
* Reference category
OR Odds ratio, ci Confidence interval
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Presumption of most important route
of infection with CSF virus
Farmers own
infected
herd (0/b)
CSF-eradication organisation
Airborne transmission
Depopulation of infected herd within 1 km
Unknown
Transport lorry of market support system
Pick-up service of rendering plant
Contaminated semen of boar stations
Open effluent lagoon of infected neighbouring
herd
Supply of infected pigs
Transport lorry of feed supplier
Pig trader
Birds
Sow scanner
Lorries transporting carcases of pigs from
depopulated infected herds driving close by
Neighbourhood infection
Farmer transmitted infection from one site
of his own herd to another
Rats and/or mice
Dogs and/or cats
Too many contacts with outside world
Slurry/manure transporter
Inseminator
22-2
21-5
17-8
104
10-4
6-7
3-7
1-5
0-7
0-7
0-7
0-7
0-7
0-7
0-7
0-7
0
0
0
0
0
Importance of
Infected herd
on infection of
a neighbour's
herd (0/°)
6-7
20-7
13-3
39-3
3-7
5-9
1-5
0
0
0
0
2-2
07
0-7
2-2
0
0-7
0
0
0
1-5
Uninfected herd
on infection of
a neighbour's
herd (0/%)
9 1
13-1
12-1
38-4
4-0
10-1
0
0
2-0
1-0
0
0
0
1.0
2-0
0
1.0
2-0
2-0
1-0
0
had been emptied by the pick-up service of the render-
ing plant;
(3) An outside helper with household cleaning had pigs at
their own home.
There was no indication of a lack of fit of the model
(Pearson residuals were between 2-2 and -2-3).
Perception of farmers concerning routes of
transmission
In the opinion of the farmers, the three most important rea-
sons why their herds had been infected were, first, the intro-
duction of the virus by the governmental eradication
organisation, secondly, airborne transmission, and thirdly, the
transmission of infectious material to the herd during the
depopulation of a neighbouring infected herd (Table 4). The
majority of farmers had no clear view of any specific routes
of infection of their neighbour's farm but, again, airborne
transmission and the depopulation of an infected neighbour
were suggested as possible routes.
Presumption of most important method for
preventing the introduction of CSFV
Farmer's own
uninfected
herd (%)
Importance of
Infected herd on Uninfected herd
a neighbour's on a neighbour's
uninfected uninfected
herd (0/%) herd (%)
Unknown 30 3 71-1 55-6
Additional hygienic measures after detection 21-2 2-2 9-1
of primary outbreak
Minimisation of personal contacts from 18-2 2.2 8-1
outside the herd
Closed farm management system 9.1 4-5 5-1
No infected herd in close vicinity 8-1 1.5 3-0
Rapid depopulation of herd by welfare slaughter 7-1 14-8 11-1
Observing rigorous hygienic measures 5-1 3-7 5-1
Conscious choice of less contact with lorry 1-0 0 0
from rendering plant
The majority of farmers had no clear view about the best
methods for preventing the introduction of the infection into
either their own or their neighbour's herd (Table 5). However,
additional hygienic measures, observing all hygienic measures
rigorously, and minimising personal contacts from outside
the farm were among the measures most commonly
suggested.
DISCUSSION
The number of contacts between an infected herd and unin-
fected herds, the infectivity of these contacts, and the suscep-
tibility of the target herds determine whether CSFV will spread
from a primary outbreak to other herds. The current policies
of the European Union (EU) discourage vaccination - apart
from emergency vaccination - against CSFV (EU Directive
80/217) and as a result it is not possible to decrease the sus-
ceptibility of pigs. The total stand-still and the general sani-
tary measures introduced during a CSFv eradication campaign
aim to minimise both the number of potentially infectious
contacts and the infectivity of these contacts. The results of
this study show that there was a small decrease in the number
of contacts with the premises and with the pig unit (but with-
out contacting the pigs) after the detection of the primary
outbreak. However, the results also indicate that there was no
difference, and even a tendency for a slight increase, in the
median number of contacts with the pigs in the pig units
between the period before and after the detection of the pri-
mary outbreak. This increase was due to the visits by screen-
ing and tracing teams. In general, the self-reported frequency
of contacts with pigs in the pig units in the period before the
detection of the first outbreak was comparable with the
results of a study in areas with a high density of pigs in the
southern part of the Netherlands (van der Gaag and other
1998).
The fact that there was no difference in the frequency of
contacts between the infected and uninfected herds in the pre-
sent study suggests that differences in the infectivity of the
contacts, influenced by hygienic measures, may help to
explain why certain herds did not become infected in an area
where the epidemic spread extensively.
The results suggest that aspects of hygiene associated with
welfare slaughter, for example, the use of boots by the lorry
driver and additional cleaning of the lorry before it entered
the premises, may have been involved in the introduction of
CSFV into the pig herd. The use of electrocution equipment on
the premises of neighbouring herds, and the possible trans-
mission of the virus by an aerosol produced when it was
cleaned with high pressure hoses may also have been a fac-
tor. There was also evidence of a lack of hygienic awareness by
the pig farmers; for example, the need to equip visitors with
clothes and boots, and lack of care with the container used
to dispose of the carcases. A striking factor was the 'protective
value' of many years of experience in pig farming. Pig farm-
ers with more than 30 years experience were working in the
1960s and 70s when hundreds to thousands of outbreaks of
CSF were common in the Netherlands (Robijns 1971). Those
experiences may have increased their awareness of how to
prevent the virus being introduced by infectious contacts.
The results provide no evidence of any new important
routes of infection. There were no associations between the
presence (or increased presence after the depopulation of an
infected neighbouring herd) of birds, like sparrows, crows and
birds of prey, cats, dogs, rats or mice around the premises and
an increased risk of infection with CSFV. These possible routes
have been discussed (Westergaard 1996), but there is very
little scientific evidence for them.
In the opinion of the farmers, airborne transmission was
among the most important modes of transmission, but there
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are few data supporting the hypothesis. The airborne trans-
mission of CSFV has been demonstrated experimentally over
a short distance and with a forced air stream (Hughes and
Gustafson 1960, Terpstra 1987) but it is considered to play
only a minor role in the transmission of the virus, and only
between mechanically ventilated pig barns less than 10 m
apart. Laevens (1998) and Mintiens and others (2000) found
evidence of airborne transmission by analysing data from the
epidemic in East Flanders (Belgium) in 1994: the more fre-
quently a neighbouring herd was downwind of an infected
herd, the more likely it was to become infected. Owing to the
design of this study, matching the herds on distance, it was
not possible to investigate this hypothesis. Clearly, it needs
further research, and data from the 1997 to 1998 epidemic has
been used to investigate it (Crauwels and others 2000).
The results of this epidemiological study should be inter-
preted carefully. It is a retrospective study, in which farmers'
memories of specific situations and circumstances have
played an important role, and the recollections of the farm-
ers with infected and uninfected herds may be substantially
different. However, since both groups were deeply involved
and affected by the epidemic, recall bias is unlikely to have
been a serious problem. However, it is possible that personal
and material contacts by the infected herds may not have been
reported, either on purpose or by accident, which could have
introduced a bias. Furthermore, 'socially acceptable' answers
may have been given when respondents were asked about
their behaviour and attitudes, and a bias could have been
introduced which resulted in potential risk factors not being
detected.
Preventing the introduction of pathogens into a pig herd
is a continual challenge for pig producers and veterinarians.
Biosecurity protocols that deal systematically with the risks of
the introduction of contagious agents and with possible pre-
ventive measures will need to be introduced and complied
with (Amas and Clark 1999). Greater hygienic awareness and
compliance to a high level of biosecurity, not only by the erad-
ication organisation but also by pig farmers, were recom-
mended by the evaluation report of the Ministry of
Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (1998). These
recommendations are included in the newly written CSF
contingency plans.
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